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I. The Health Care Malpractice Act Regulates Claims for the Alleged
Mishandling of the Transference Phenomenon at Issue Here.
The heart of Ms. Dowling's argument on appeal is that "Ms. Bullen's actions
could not have been the type that the legislature would have contemplated in its 'any act
or treatment' language. Ms. Bullen's behavior in starting a sexual relationship with Mr.
Dowling [sic] during his therapy, thereby alienating Ms. Dowling, cannot be considered
an 'act or treatment' which was 'performed or furnished during the patient's medical
care, treatment, or confinement' because it did not relate to or arise out of medical
treatment or healthcare treatment." Brief of Respondent at 10. This argument fails for
several reasons.
First, it is undisputed in the record that Ms. Bullen did not meet James or Ms.
Dowling until they presented with their daughters for therapy. Affidavit of Kathleen
Bullen, R. 31 - 33. Any subsequent relationship between Ms. Bullen and James could
only have developed during the therapy sessions, was related to the therapy sessions, and
arose out of the therapy sessions. Dowling v. Bullen, 2002 UT App 372 at T| 8, 58 P.3d
878.
Second, the definition of health care includes "any act or treatment performed or
furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment or
confinement." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(10) (emphasis added). Ms. Dowling is
seeking damages for what Ms. Bullen allegedly failed to do, i.e., heal the family and act
within the parameters of a therapist, as much as she is seeking to recover for what Ms.
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Bullen allegedly did, i.e., alienate James's affections. Ms. Bullen's failure to provide the
care and treatment for which the family contracted is the very conduct that the Health
Care Malpractice Act was designed to regulate The definition of what constitutes an
action for malpractice unequivocally reaches to an "action against a health care provider,
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon
alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should
have been rendered by the health care provider." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(14)
(emphasis added).
Third, this Court has held that mishandling the transference phenomenon, resulting
in sexual misconduct in the context of the therapist/patient relationship, is malpractice for
a psychotherapist. Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52 at Tf 17, 26 P.3d 227, 232. In
that case the plaintiff sued for the destruction of her marriage that ensued when she and
her therapist developed a sexual relationship immediately following the termination of
therapy. Her claim was barred by the Act's two-year statute of limitations because she
did not file suit within two years of the initiation of the sexual relationship but waited
several years and filed suit only after her sexual relationship ended. See also, Birkner v.
Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053 (1989) (licensed clinical social worker liable for
malpractice for sexual misconduct, employer guilty of failure to supervise but not
vicariously liable for the malpractice of the social worker).
The courts are not alone in addressing this issue. The legislature delegated to the
Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, the
obligation to define conduct that is below the standard of care, what the statute calls
2

"unprofessional conduct."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-60-110(2). The regulations

promulgated pursuant to this legislative mandate condemn sexual conduct between a
licensed clinical social worker and her patient, or the family member(s) of her patient, as
unprofessional conduct. See, UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R156-60a-502(l 1) - 502(13).
Taken to its logical conclusion, Ms. Dowling's argument would completely
eviscerate the Act because malpractice is never the type of care the "provider was trained
to provide." Respondent's Brief on Appeal at 10. What doctor is trained to amputate the
healthy leg? Or prescribe a contraindicated medication? Or fail to diagnose breast
cancer? Or ignore indications of suicidal ideation? Mishandling the transference
phenomenon is no less malpractice than any of these other forms of malpractice and is
governed by the Health Care Malpractice Act.
Fourth, and perhaps most insidiously, Ms. Dowling implies that the Court must
inquire into the care giver's state of mind before it can decide whether the conduct at
issue constitutes malpractice. (In particular, Ms. Dowling suggests that the Act does not
apply if Ms. Bullen's alleged motive became to in engage in a sexual relationship with
James.) If the care giver is motivated by any purpose other than healing then,
presumably, the Act does not apply.
This "pure motive" requirement conflicts head-on with the legislature's definition
of health care, which extends to "any act or treatment," and with the fundamental purpose
of the Act which is "to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers

" UTAH CODE ANN. §78-14-3(10) and -2, respectively.

Further, it transforms a civil malpractice action into what is, essentially, a criminal
3

prosecution without the benefit of the higher burden of proof or the privilege against self
incrimination. An inquiry into motive is inherently unworkable and needlessly
complicates what is already a complex and difficult process, and would preclude
resolution of the Act's applicability by motion.
Finally, the single case upon which Ms. Dowling relies is inapposite. The factual
statement provided by the Court in its opinion in Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah
1991), is completely devoid of any reference to a physician/patient relationship between
Macfarlane and the plaintiffs wife, and provides no insight whatsoever into whether the
adulterous activities were connected in any way with the provision of health care. The
case does not purport to discuss the Health Care Malpractice Act nor to explicate the
circumstances under which a doctor is covered or not covered by the Act. Importantly, it
does not address the applicable statute of limitations. There is no discussion of the
transference phenomenon or whether failure properly to manage that phenomenon
constitutes malpractice. Instead, the Court used the case to outline the fundamental
policy reasons favoring the continued viability of the tort of alienation of affections and
disfavoring the continued viability of the tort of criminal conversation. It is not helpful to
the process of deciding whether Ms. Dowling's claims are barred by the two-year statute
of limitations found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1).
II. Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., Subjects Derivative
Claims, like Ms. Bowling's Alienation of Affections Claim,
to the Two-Year Statute of Limitations in the Act.
Ms. Dowling is correct when she observes that, under the appellate court's
reasoning in Dowling v. Bullen, 2002 UT App 372 atffif9 and 10, only Shelly Hipwell
4

would qualify as the "complaining patient" in Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d
327 (Utah 1997). Contrary to her assertion, however, Shelly Hipwell was not the
"complaining patient" in that malpractice action. Instead, the plaintiffs in that case were,
just as they are here, family members (husband and mother) of the "complaining patient."
Shelly Hipwell failed timely to complain against her health care providers and, as a
consequence, both her claim and the derivative claim for wrongful death brought by her
husband and mother were barred by the statute of limitations. That is precisely the same
result that should obtain here and that is precisely why the appellate court's decision
directly conflicts with this Court's ruling in Jensen.
Ms. Dowling's attempt to distinguish this case from Jensen on the basis that James
will never complain against Ms. Bullen because he is married to her misses the mark.
Ms. Dowling's cause of action for the destruction of her marriage relationship, while
derivative of the treatment rendered, or which should have been rendered, to James by
Ms. Bullen, does not depend on James participating in her case or filing one of his own.
Just as the husband and mother of Shelly Hipwell could have filed a lawsuit on Shelly's
behalf long before her death (they had been appointed her guardian) and, presumably,
could also have filed their own claims for destruction of the marriage and family
relationships before the expiration of the statute of limitations, so Ms. Dowling could
have pursued her claim for the destruction of her marriage before her statute of
limitations expired. She cannot blame her inaction on James's decision not to be the
"complaining patient."
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The Legislature said that if the cause of action "relat[es] to or aris[es]out of health
care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider" it is
subject to the provisions of the Act. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(14). If a patient or the
family members of a patient have been injured as a result of malpractice by a health care
provider they are free to bring their actions so long as they comply with the provisions of
the Act. Ms. Dowling's failure to take action for four years means quite simply that her
claim is barred.
Ms. Dowling also makes the argument that Jensen was decided on the basis that
the Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations is more specific than the
wrongful death statute because the definition of malpractice specifically includes
"wrongful death" as one of the types of claims that could be pursued. She overlooks the
fact that the definition also includes claims sounding "in contract, tort, breach of warranty
. . . or otherwise." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(14). Alienation of affections is a tort.
Using her own reasoning, the Act provides the more specific statute of limitations where
that tort is committed in the context of mental health therapy, and thus bars Ms.
Dowling's action.
Ms. Dowling impliedly argues that mishandling the transference phenomenon is
different from the more traditional forms of malpractice at issue in Jensen and that this
difference in the nature of the malpractice distinguishes the two cases. She seems
uncomfortable with the obvious fact that the Legislature intended a comprehensive
scheme for regulating malpractice actions and chose to include mental health workers
within the coverage of the Act. Ms. Bullen agrees that the mental health worker's
6

treatment methods—and therefore forms of malpractice—differ from those of the
cardiologist, obstetrician or surgeon. See Ms. Bullen's Brief on Appeal at 16 - 18.
However, the difference in the medical procedures does not support Ms. Dowling's
argument that the Jensen case presents a different legal issue. Both cases involve
precisely the same legal issue, i.e., whether the claims of family members which derive
from the treatment rendered to the patient are governed by the Health Care Malpractice
Act. This Court has said they are; the appellate court said they are not—and should be
reversed.1
III. The Appellate Court Has Removed
Breach of Confidentiality from the Scope of the Act.
Ms. Dowling's discussion of the breach of confidentiality, brief though it is,
illustrates some fundamental problems with the appellate court's creation of the
"complaining patient" doctrine. She argues that "all breach of confidentiality malpractice
actions will be subject to the Act so long as the complaint or derivative action is brought
by or on behalf of the 'complaining patient.'" Dowling's Brief on Appeal at 15 - 16.
First, neither she nor the appellate court defines who the "complaining patient" is in the
context of the breach of confidentiality claim. Second, the doctrine creates confusion and

Ironically, there is one significant fact that does distinguish the instant case from Jensen:
unlike the husband and mother who were never under the care, treatment or confinement of
Shelly's doctors or the hospitals, Ms. Dowling was a patient of Ms. Bullen's at the time the
alleged wrong-doing occurred. She was under Ms. Bullen's active care and treatment for the
several months during which Ms. Bullen was allegedly alienating James's affections leading to
his decision to file for divorce, and was still seeing Ms. Bullen until a month later, when Ms.
Bullen suggested that she find a new therapist. Accordingly, her claims are not only derivative
of the treatment allegedly rendered to James but arise directly out of the treatment allegedly
rendered to her. Her claims are clearly barred by the two-year statute of limitations in the Health
Care Malpractice Act.
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is analytically inconsistent and difficult to apply. If the "complaining patient" is James
because the breach occurred during his therapy session, then the Act governs the claim
only when he files it on Ms. Dowling's behalf (which is legally problematic) or on his
own behalf in his capacity as the derivative plaintiff (because the confidences that were
breached are Ms. Dowling's) and not when Ms. Dowling, the direct claimant, files it. If,
on the other hand, Ms. Dowling is the "complaining patient" (because her confidences
were breached by her therapist), then the Act would require that she bring her suit within
two years, which she failed to do. If the Act does not govern Ms. Dowling's claim for
breach of confidentiality, which is the net effect of the appellate court's ruling below,
then breach of confidentiality actions have been removed from the coverage of the Act.
Third, the doctrine creates multiple statutes of limitation applicable to the very
same transaction or event. As noted above, James would be limited to bringing the
action, either on Ms. Dowling's behalf or on his own behalf, by the two year statute in §
78-14-4(1) while Ms. Dowling presumably would have the four years set out in § 78-1225(3). This argument was developed in considerable detail in Ms. Bullen's opening brief
and need not be repeated here. None of the authorities cited by Ms. Dowling, and none
of the arguments she presents, refute this point.
Finally, Ms. Dowling's argument ignores the allegations of her own complaint.
She says, "[i]n Dowling's complaint the alienation of affection claim expressly relates to
Bullen's treatment of James. The allegations state 'Defendant Bullen, by her actions in
divulging Plaintiff's confidences, used her position of trust and influence as a licensed
clinical social worker and family counselor to poison Plaintiffs husband against
8

Plaintiff.5" Dowling's Brief on Appeal at 16 - 17 (emphasis added). The undeniable fact
is that Ms. Dowling complained that Ms. Bullen "poisoned" James against Ms. Dowling
by means of divulging unflattering confidential information that Ms. Bullen obtained in
therapy with Ms. Dowling. That is the key allegation, not that the breach occurred during
therapy with James. Ms. Dowling is not complaining that James received substandard
treatment but that she received substandard treatment from her own therapist. As such,
her claim is governed by the Health Care Malpractice Act and is barred by the statute of
limitations. Any other ruling eliminates actions for breach of confidentiality from the
coverage of the Act.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The opinion and ruling of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the
summary judgment entered by the District Court should be reinstated and judgment
should be entered in favor of Ms. Bullen on the basis that the two-year statute of
limitations contained in the Act bars these claims.
DATED this < S ^ day of July, 2003.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

f i l l i p S. I^rguson
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Kathleen Bullen-Hoagland
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